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Example of Religion in Nietzsche and Levinas. 
 
Not to speak about God is to be afraid of him, is still to 
feel uncomfortable about him (about his image or place 
in the interconnections of reality and language…), is to 
put off till later the examination of the emptiness he 
represents, put off shattering it with laughter. 
Bataille 
 
In what has come to be called Continental philosophy, we are conceivably faced 
with two possible directions: phenomenology and genealogy. In discussing the question of 
religion in Nietzsche and Levinas, which is the overt subject matter of this paper, I want to 
contrast these two possibilities. Under the title of phenomenology, I am thinking of those 
writers who are inspired by the work of Husserl, and under genealogy by Nietzsche. In 
respect, however, to the specific question of religion, I wish to focus on the work of 
Levinas. This is because, as Dominique Janicaud has argued, he is the one 
phenomenologist whose own work perhaps already presupposes a religious point of view.1 
The intention, however, is not merely to contrast Levinas’s concept of God with 
Nietzsche’s, nor even, as some recent publications have done, to defend Levinas from the 
accusation of being the latest in the long line of the defenders of a slave morality, but to 
reach the heart of this division between genealogy and phenomenology.2  
To do this we first of all need to understand phenomenology. We cannot hope to 
give a full account of the complexity of this tradition, but it is possible to describe its 
general orientation by going back to its originator Husserl. It would be absurd to claim that 
one might be able to give an adequate summary of his work, whose originality, depth, and 
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above all length is foreboding for any commentator, but it is possible to present the barest 
of sketches, which is adequate for our purpose here. Without this outline Levinas’s own 
defence of the significance of the word God will remain obscure. We might be misled, for 
instance, into thinking that Levinas’s attachment to the word God arises only from his 
religious belief, rather than any philosophical justification. Of course Levinas does not 
prove the existence of God in a traditional manner, but the phenomenological description 
of the ethical relation allows him to continue to use the word God against what he himself 
would see as Nietzsche’s atheism. He can do so because he believes that this atheism has 
merely destroyed the theological God as the ultimate signifier behind this world, but not 
the ancient God of monotheism. There is no doubt that Nietzsche saw himself as having 
destroyed the metaphysical God, but it is not certain that this is the only object of his 
critique. Does not God also have a political and social function in Nietzsche whose 
analysis goes beyond dismantling the metaphysical grammar of theology that believes that 
simply because we have a word there must be something that corresponds to it? Is not 
Nietzsche’s real interest, for example in the Genealogy of Morals, the construction of 
subjectivity through the interpellation of the voice of God that is interpreted through the 
specific type of the priest? In other words, is not Nietzsche just as much dedicated to a 
genealogy of the God of monotheism, as he is in dismantling the God of metaphysics, 
which is just a pale and watered down reflection of the former? 
The difference in approach can be summarised as follows: for Nietzsche, it is the 
pragmatics of power within language that is the object of the genealogical analysis. It is not 
the definition of words that is first of all important, but the context of their use. A black on 
the streets, who uses the word ‘nigger’ against the police as an affirmation of his power, is 
quite different from a white policeman who uses this word as a form of abuse. The 
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genealogical question concerning God is not what does this word mean, but what is its 
function, how is it used in relation to power. For Levinas, on the contrary, it is what this 
word means that is the starting point. His question is whether the meaning of the word God 
is the same as its philosophical definition. To demonstrate the partiality of the 
philosophical approach, which means showing that there is another way of speaking about 
God that does not belong to any definition, including the definition, as Levinas sees it, of is 
use, is also to exceed the genealogical critique.  
This seems to me to be the sharp difference between phenomenology and 
genealogy. Is it possible to make this absolute breach between the meaning of a word and 
its use? One cannot imagine Nietzsche, like Levinas, insisting that the ‘books of Judaism’ 
must be read from their ‘own proper language’ before and outside of reading them as 
historical or sociological documents.3 This is not to deny that the books of Judaism do not 
have their own language, one that for Levinas upsets the apparent universalism of Western 
thought, but it is to insist that every language must be mixed up with social reality. It seems 
to me that this is the phenomenological legacy of Levinas’s approach: the separation of 
meaning from social reality. This does not mean that meaning does not have a relation to 
social reality for phenomenology, as for instance in genetic phenomenology, but it is 
always an ‘action across a distance’. Phenomenology rests upon a fundamental ontological 
distinction between meaning and social reality. This is the whole result of its separation 
between subjective and objective representation. Of course, Levinas’s phenomenology is 
an exaggerated phenomenology, where meaning is pushed beyond the intentional content 
of consciousness. None the less, this meaning (and it is the aim of Levinas’s work to show 
that such a meaning is not contradictory) comes from outside of social practices. The 
Judaic concept of God is therefore not the result of the history of the Israelite religion, 
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rather the history of the Israelite religion is the result of the intervention of the God of 
Judaism. Its purity is preserved, even though its ideality is no longer the ideality of 
intentionality. The latter, however, is Levinas’s point of departure, so let us first begin with 
its description. Then we shall go on to discuss Levinas’s justification of the word God and 
compare it to Nietzsche’s genealogical analysis. 
Phenomenology and the Ideality of Meaning 
The phenomenologist starts with meaning. It is thus quite wrong to think that the 
famous phenomenological slogan ‘back to the things themselves’ is a rally cry for a 
realism that asserts that we can all give up the onerous task of understanding for a blissful 
plunging into the world. A phenomenologist does not perceive, judge or love things, but a 
meaning through which this or that thing appears. This means that there is not first of all 
sense data which I then have to, in a second moment of cognitive synthesis, assemble into 
a meaningful object, rather the thing is right from the start given to me as something 
meaningful. I do not hear sense data; rather I hear the sound of the car as it goes past my 
window. Things are not mute beings that await my magical touch in order to resonate; 
rather the world already speaks to me, as though it had its own language that I must 
continually attempt to decipher. 
There is something very powerful about this vision, and it would be wrong to 
dismiss it too quickly. For who really believes that our experience of the world is merely a 
collection of impressions some how miraculously forming into objects we might 
recognise? Do things have their own language or do they speak only because we have 
already named them? In terms of traditional epistemology, we seem to have two 
alternatives: either meaning is to be found in the subject, or in the object. If the origin of 
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meaning were to be found in me, then it would have a psychological basis. If, on the 
contrary, meaning were to be found in the object, then we would seem to be looking at a 
kind of realism. In the first case, meaning is a mental event, and in the latter, it is 
something that stands outside us as the very reality of the objects. 
Phenomenology is the rejection of both the alternatives. Let us, therefore, examine 
the phenomenological theory of meaning in closer detail. To repeat: I see a table before 
me. I do not see first of all meaningless sense impressions, which I then fashion into a 
table, rather I see right away a table. This is because my relation to objects is already 
orientated or guided by meaning (or what Husserl will call in Ideas, noemata). But it 
would be quite foolish to try to find the meaning of the word ‘table’ inside someone’s 
head. This does not mean that there could be thoughts without a mind thinking them, but 
the meaning of these thoughts is not to be found in the activity of thinking. The meaning 
can only be found in the content of the thought that for Husserl is quite independent from 
the mental event that is its psychical cause. 
It is because we are speaking beings that we can postulate the separation of what is 
meant from the act of meaning, whereas the bark of a dog is merely a sign; it contains 
nothing but what itself indicates. The independence of meaning has as its foundation the 
linguistic division between expression and content, and it is perhaps this distinction which 
is the fundamental cornerstone of Husserlian phenomenology, for without it an eidetic 
science, a pure logical grammar, would be an impossibility. We can perhaps understand 
signification and expression as the difference between the concept and the word. The word 
expresses a signification, a certain ideational content or concept. This content, however, 
should not be confused with word that is merely the vehicle of its signification. It is this 
property of language, as the transmitter of conceptual content, which is the condition for 
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the division between the act of meaning and what is meant - for although every word is 
marked by the individuality of the speaker, the concept is not. We should not just think that 
the world, like an image in a mirror, is merely repeated in language, rather the ideational 
content of language provides the organisation, determination and general schema of the 
world. This is why the problem of phenomenology is not how I know the world, but how 
the world is already constituted in the act of knowing. 
In phenomenology, the ideality of meaning, since it is neither something physical 
or psychical, is set apart from the world. This is why the only way to reach it is through the 
reduction, which brackets the world. This bracketing, however, is the result of a decision. 
This is the paradox: one must have already been convinced by the reduction in order to 
perform it; that is to say, that one must already know that there is a conceptual sphere (the 
interconnecting web of linguistic meanings) that transcends the world in order to begin 
philosophy. The problem is not whether this conceptual sphere exists or not, but what is its 
origin. For Husserl it is the ideality of meaning itself that produces the conceptual sphere. 
Thus, social reality is the result of the conceptual sphere and not the other way around. The 
conceptual sphere falls back upon social practices and produces their reality, just as 
mathematical abstractions produce the thought in the mathematician’s brain. But why is it 
not social reality, as the arena of the conflict of power, that produces the conceptual sphere, 
and no longer as connection of essences that have a unitary meaning in relation to one 
another, but whose meanings are continually in flux in relation to their function, and whose 
political force cannot be reduced to any objective content? The phenomenologist first of all 
sets the reality of social practices apart, and then finds the ideality of meaning (no one is 
saying that this ideality does not exist, but it is social practices that are its origin) and then 
in a second moment defines social reality in relation to them. The same operation is 
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present is Levinas’s statement, which we referred to earlier, that the books of Judaism have 
their own proper language that is set apart from the institutions of Judaism, and which then 
fall back on these institutions and define them from outside of history. But institutions are 
far more complex than that are they not? Far more devious and cunning? Could it not be 
social practices that produce meaning and one that is always shifting as the conflict of 
forces within it change.  And could we not also say this of the word God, even the God of 
Judaism? Is it legitimate to claim that there is a proper language to Judaism, which 
transcends its entire historical vicissitudes, or even that there is only one Judaism? But this 
is precisely what Levinas does argue for and from a phenomenological starting point. 
The Transcendence of the Other and God 
The important question is whether Levinas’s commitment to Judaism indicates a 
break with phenomenology. It does not in two ways: first of all it is irrelevant to Levinas 
whether God exists in a realist sense (thus he follows the phenomenological reduction), but 
more importantly in terms of this contrast to Nietzsche, the meaning of the word God is 
abstracted from any social context. Thus, even though Levinas will argue that the 
significance of the word God lies outside the philosophical concept of God (and this might 
mistakenly lead us to think that we therefore have left phenomenology utterly behind) it 
does so only from within a negative phenomenological manoeuvre of a double reduction. 
First of all, you reduce the social and political context of the word’s use, then its 
conceptual content to arrive a pure saying.  
Let us first examine this double reduction in greater detail and then compare it to 
Nietzsche’s approach in the next section. The word God, for Levinas, does not signify 
something real, but neither is it an objective representation. The religious significance of 
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God exceeds any ideational content and this is where the description exceeds intentional 
analysis, but not phenomenology, for there is no reason why phenomenology needs to be 
equated with intentional analysis. There can be for Levinas a phenomenology of the non-
intentional. The word God is non-intentional not because there it has referent beyond the 
word, but the word itself breaks with referentiality. God cannot be subsumed under the 
concept of God. This would be a traditional negative theology, if it were not for the fact 
that it as much a stepping back from the reality of God, as the idea of God. Negative 
theology rejects the idea of God for the sake of the reality of God, and then faces the 
problem of how one can testify to the existence of a God beyond words.  
In the Western tradition, theology has always submitted itself to philosophy even 
when it believed that it had surmounted it. Theology appeared to face two alternatives: 
either the content of its faith could be contained within reason or it exceeded reason. But 
theology’s double bind, for Levinas, is that even if it chooses to oppose reason, its other 
was reason’s other. Thus negative theology is always the inverted image of positive 
theology, faith the inverted image of reason. Reason conceives of God in terms of the 
ground of the totality of being. The only route left to negative theology or faith, which 
demands its only uniqueness, is mysticism. Yet this mysticism is the result of reason’s 
victory. For it has no words to speak with, since reason has already decided the limits of 
what is meaningful. Its meaninglessness is reason’s meaninglessness and its silence is 
merely the other side of reason’s speech. 
Levinas’s stepping back from the definition of God in Western philosophy is not 
retreat back into a religion that is certain of the existence of God, but to a tradition that has 
kept alive a significance of a word beyond every concept. This significance beyond the 
idea Levinas describes in the ethical relation to the Other. God is not present in this 
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relation, in the sense of hiding behind it, or of being its ultimate reference, rather the 
ethical relation is the manner in which there is significance to the word God beyond 
essence and existence, beyond both God’s definition and supposed reality beyond this 
world. Such a God is not the same God as the God of the philosophers, which Levinas 
believes is the target of modern atheism. Here lies his philosophical justification. If 
atheism has only demolished the reality and ideality of God, then the God of ethics, which 
is the actual God of monotheism undistorted by its tutelage to metaphysics, remains 
untouched, for it is a God that is neither real nor an idea. This is a trajectory of a 
phenomenology pushed to its extreme: abstract from the real to expose the concept, 
abstract from the concept to expose the word. 
The relation to God is present there as a relation to man. This is 
not a metaphor: there is a real presence of God in the Other. In my 
relation to the Other, I hear the Word of God. This is not a 
metaphor, this is not only extremely important it is true to the 
letter. I am not saying that the Other is God, but that in his Face I 
hear the Word of God.4 
Of course it would be quite simple to say that this too is a definition of God. We no 
longer define God, for example, in terms of the transcendentals as the Medieval 
philosophers did, but as the ethical relation to the Other. But it is not in the description of 
the ethical relation from the position of an observer than Levinas finds God, but in the face 
of the Other as such, inasmuch as it exceeds any definition. Levinas will describe this 
exposure to the Other as a pure saying outside of any said. The speech of God belongs to 
this saying. The speech of God is not said by some one hidden in the clouds, but is 
expressed in the ethical response. There is no ideatum that would correspond to this 
saying. 
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It is within this context that we must understand Levinas’s belief that there is a 
phenomenological defence of the word God beyond a merely personal commitment to 
religious belief. Traditional arguments for the existence or non-existence of God take place 
within an already constituted ontology. Either we can go from the definition of God to 
existence, or the existence of beings already presupposes the existence of God. For Levinas 
these arguments have nothing to do with God, but with a metaphysics, with a certain 
conception of the ‘totality of beings’. We first of all begin with this idea and then end up 
with the concept of God. But the God of monotheism has nothing at all to do with this 
metaphysics. It names (though this name has no ultimate signified) as the prohibition of 
pronouncing the word God in Judaism testifies, the ethical relation to Other and it belongs 
to the ‘performance’ of this relation rather than to its description and yet it is an event, if 
we can even call it that, which takes place wholly outside of any social reality.  
Nietzsche and the Critique of Values 
The question that remains is whether this defence of the word God, its 
monotheistic ethical significance as opposed to its metaphysical definition, side steps 
Nietzsche’s atheism. Levinas writes as though Nietzsche were almost on his side, as 
though the demolishing of this metaphysical God, this God that is the invention of 
grammar, would allow the true meaning of God to arise. Yet don’t they start from a 
different place? Their problems are not the same. Thus Nietzsche destroys the God of 
metaphysics not to reveal its authentic meaning, but to uncover the social mechanism of 
which he believes it is indispensable part. If we interpret Nietzsche’s statement that God is 
dead only as atheism, then we have not understood it all. We can be quite sure that 
Nietzsche was not in the least interested in whether God existed or not, rather he was 
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interested in the values which were expressed in such a belief, and their extra-moral origin. 
This is entirely different from phenomenology, which begins with meanings abstracted 
from their social milieu, since it absolves them from their origin in discursive practices. 
Levinas’s work, rather than working against this abstraction within phenomenology is only 
its intensification, since the ethical relation to the Other is stripped of any relation to 
history whatsoever. The interruption of history is not through possibilities that are at this 
moment crushed by the present, but from a pure eschatological future. 
Nietzsche’s response would be that every concept of God, even Levinas’s, has a 
history and one that cannot be thought from within the phenomenological starting point or 
even its reversal by Levinas. Language is neither the expression of thought, nor the 
irreducible alterity of the other, but the site of the confrontation of forces, of which our 
concepts are merely the result rather than its origin. The grave error of philosophy, 
Nietzsche warns us, is always to take what is last, as though it were first, and then to 
abstract it from the very process of its emergence. Language is never just the naming of 
things nor the addressing of an interlocutor, rather it is always the institution of an order. 
Language exists alongside a field of historical forces that shape, mould and even produce 
the subject, and its relation to others, which is merely presupposed in the 
phenomenological or linguistic starting point. The great difference between the 
phenomenologist and the genealogist is that the former separates language, idealises it, 
from discursive practice, whereas the latter, knows that syntax and semantics cannot be 
defined independently from a fluid and indeterminate zone of social conflict. The professor 
speaks to the student. What matters in this encounter is not so much what is said between 
them, the ideational content, nor even their own subjective positions in relation to this 
content, but the relation of power co-extensive with it. Language is first of all a pragmatics 
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of power, before it is a semantics and syntax: ‘one does not even speak so as to be 
believed, but to obey or to make obey.’5  
Take Nietzsche’s example of punishment in the Genealogy of Morals.6 There are 
those, he writes, who think that the relation between an object and its meaning is simple, as 
though the object bore its meaning like a label. There are those, for example, who think 
that the meaning of punishment is revenge or deterrence. They then, in a second move, 
place this meaning as a final cause, as the origin of punishment itself. Thus we punish 
people in order to deter them from committing other crimes, or as an act of revenge either 
on behalf of the community as a whole or the individuals as victims of the crime. The 
correct historical method, however, shows that the emergence of an object and its meaning 
is not contemporaneous. Everything that has come into being can be used for different 
purposes and aims by different powers. The definition of punishment does not give us its 
essence, rather it is the external sign of what a power at a given time and place has stamped 
upon it. If we look at the history of punishment, therefore, we do not find some timeless 
essence that stands above changing circumstances, rather we discover a continually 
renewed history of interpretations. These interpretations do not exhibit a logical 
progression under the attraction of a telos, rather an object is an aggregate of discontinuous 
and heterogeneous elements which, Nietzsche emphasises, makes it completely 
‘indefinable’ (undefinierbar). Only that which has no history could have an essence.7 The 
history of an object exceeds species definition not because it is beyond language, but 
because it consists of a constellation of discourses that have seized upon it and which are 
divergent and even anomalous to one another. 
How might we apply this genealogical method to the word God? Nietzsche gives 
us such an example in the Anti-Christ.8 To understand the emergence (die Entstehung) of 
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Christianity, he argues, one must understand the soil from which it grew. This soil is 
Judaism. Christianity must not be understood as being opposed to Judaism, but as its 
‘logical conclusion’. Judaism is defined by Nietzsche as the falsification of all nature and 
reality. Christianity is a copy of this falsification only to a vastly greater extent. This 
falsification has in turn its own origin. It does not occur in isolation. All moralities emerge 
from within a network of relations and forces. Judaic-Christian morality is a ‘no-saying’ 
against the affirmation of life. What is it that affirms life? That which is ‘well-constituted’, 
powerful, beautiful and self-affirming’, and it is this which is negated by the invention of a 
world beyond this world. 
Judaism is to be understood as turning away from ‘values of nature’ (die 
Naturwerte). There are, according to Nietzsche, five stages to this process.9 Originally, 
especially in the time of the kingdom, Israel had a natural relation to all things. What does 
Nietzsche mean by ‘natural’ here? He means that their God expressed their own feeling of 
being powerful. God is an affirmation of their own feeling of righteousness. This first 
moment is a ‘yes-saying’. The second moment was the alteration of this God type into the 
‘God of justice.’ And this was a denaturalising of the idea of God. It no longer has 
anything to do with the realities of life. This God is a priestly conception of God. And now 
every piece of misfortune or fortune was the result of obeying or disobeying God. What 
better way could the priests have gained power, except by inventing such a concept? A 
God who demands and punishes, rather than gives help and advice. Here, for the first time, 
God becomes something abstract, something that is opposed to the natural conditions of 
life for a people. Now the people no longer express themselves in a God which affirms 
their life, but which negates it. No longer God, but a God-concept (der Gottesbegriff). The 
third moment was the re-interpretation, by the priest, of the whole of the historical past of 
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Israel in religious terms, such that this history became nothing more than a ‘mechanism for 
salvation’ (ein Heils-Mechanismus). The natural world order was replaced by the ‘moral 
world order’ (der sittlichen Weltordnung), in which every action of a people or an 
individual is measured by how much or how little it corresponds to the will of God. And 
who knows the will of God? The priest. In this development, all is measured by the values 
of the priest. Thus the greatest time of the Kingdom is said to be its decline. For the priests 
to falsify history in this manner, they needed a ‘revelation’, an exterior symbol of truth. 
They need a holy book, a scripture. This is the fourth moment. At this moment, of course, 
he (and it was always ‘he’) becomes indispensable. For who else can interpret the 
scriptures except the priest; who else will be able to say what the will of God is? The fifth 
moment is when every part of life, birth, marriage, sickness and death, must be interpreted 
in relation to how the priest interprets God’s will. The concept of sin is born. Sin only 
exists in a society where priests have the ultimate power. 
The conclusion of this brief discussion is not to face the reader with a blunt choice 
between phenomenology and genealogy, but to show that their problems are quite 
different, and thus their defence of or attack upon God is quite different. For this reason, 
we can say that Levinas and Nietzsche never meet. For Levinas there is an ethical 
transcendence that exceeds the social field and thus there is a significance to God that is 
exterior to the conflict of forces. For Nietzsche, such a discourse from nowhere would be 
unbelievable and would merely be one more cunning manner in which power conceals 
itself. If follows from the missed encounter, that Levinas can never find a satisfactory 
response to Nietzsche’s atheism, for to do so would be deny completely the transcendence 
of the ethical relation and this explains why Nietzsche genealogical critique is lost in his 
metaphysical one. Nietzsche is seen as merely the last in line destroyers of the God of 
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philosophy, of which Levinas himself can justly claim to belong. Nietzsche aim, however, 
is not merely to argue against the God of philosophy at the level of its meaning, but to 
delineate its origin, and thereby demonstrate its inseparability from the social institution of 
power in the manner in which it constructs different kinds of subjectivities.  
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